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The S&P 500 stock index is down almost 40
percent from its peak value in 2000. Where does
that leave the case for personal retirement
accounts, which would allow workers to invest
their Social Security payroll taxes in stocks and
bonds through accounts similar to individual
retirement accounts or 401(k)s? 
The evidence shows that long-term market
investment for Social Security, while hardly risk
free, bears little resemblance to the “meltdown”
scenarios painted by many account opponents.
Opponents of personal accounts implicitly
assume that workers with accounts would be
short-term investors without any nonstock
diversification. In the real world, the combina-
tion of asset diversification between stocks and
bonds and time diversification over long time
horizons reduces the risks that a short-term
market drop could substantially affect workers’
retirement incomes. Even in today’s bear mar-
ket, workers with personal accounts would retire
with higher total retirement incomes than the
current pay-as-you-go program is able to pay. 
Moreover, personal accounts would allow
individual workers to take on only as much mar-
ket risk as they are comfortable with. The public
realizes this, and support for personal accounts
is higher today than it was at the market’s peak.
If personal accounts would be a good policy
even today, and if they retain public support even
today, it is hard to imagine a circumstance in
which they would not. Today’s stock market
declines do not contradict the case for personal
accounts. In fact, they confirm it.
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Introduction
Imagine the following deal: You could
invest part or all of your Social Security taxes
in a personal retirement account. However,
your account could hold nothing but stocks
and you would retire during the biggest bear
market since the Great Depression.
Would workers accept such a deal? I
would. Even today, personal accounts would
increase retirement benefits while giving
workers greater ownership and control over
their savings.
Slumping stock markets have opponents
of personal accounts claiming vindication. A
falling stock market, they argue, shows that
only a traditional government-run, defined-
benefit Social Security program can provide
adequate retirement security. As Senate
Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D-S.D.) put it
on July 12: 
After what’s happened in the stock
market the last few weeks, we think it’s
a terrible idea. . . . Imagine if you were
retiring this week, with most major
stock indexes hitting five-year lows.1
Indeed, many Americans are sure to be con-
cerned after hearing such comments.
But in judging the risks of long-term mar-
ket investment on the basis of just a few
months or years of returns, these opponents
of personal accounts are victims of the so-
called law of small numbers—the propensity
to believe that a small sample is representa-
tive of the larger universe of outcomes.2 Like
those who took a few years of double-digit
stock returns in the 1990s to portend a
future of limitless investment riches, oppo-
nents of personal accounts have failed to
examine the historical facts regarding stock
and bond returns over the long term.
Those facts show that, even today, personal
accounts would increase benefits and help
strengthen Social Security for the long term.
However bad the market’s recent performance,
a worker retiring today would have begun
investing in the late 1950s. The stock market
has never once lost money over even 20-year
periods. Even without diversification, a worker
retiring today would have 40 years of invest-
ment behind him to make up for recent losses.
A worker just entering the market would have
40 years to regain lost ground. There is simply
no way recent events can credibly justify a disas-
trous scenario for personal accounts. Even a
worker retiring in the Great Depression would
have received a 4 percent annual return after
inflation;3 a worker retiring today would do
substantially better.
Personal accounts give workers the oppor-
tunity to diversify their investments across hun-
dreds or even thousands of stocks and bonds,
reducing the risk that declines in a single com-
pany or asset class would severely harm a work-
er’s retirement income. Moreover, long time
horizons provide “time diversification” that
smoothes out the short-term volatility of
investments in the stock market.
Historically, in almost all cases workers
with diversified market investments would
have received substantially higher benefits if
allowed to invest part or all of their payroll
taxes in personal retirement accounts. Under
Social Security reform proposals already on
the table, practically all workers could expect
to increase their total retirement incomes by
opting to participate in personal accounts,
even if they had to give up part of their tradi-
tional benefits to do so. 
Stock market investment is indeed risky
over the short term. But over the long term,
stocks and bonds clearly can form the basis
of stable and adequate retirement wealth
accumulation for all workers. 
Asset Diversification:
Mixing Stocks and Bonds
Stocks are risky investments over the
short run, varying greatly from year to year.
Bonds and other fixed-income investments,
while producing lower returns over the long
term, provide the year-to-year stability that
many investors demand (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1
Stocks Produce Greater Returns Than Bonds over the Long Run but at the Cost of
Higher Short-Term Volatility
A
nn
ua
l R
et
ur
n 
(a
fte
r i
nf
la
tio
n)
57
59
54
46
40
58
55
52
46
39
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-65
Male
Female
Figure 2
Workers Move Out of Equities As They Near Retirement, Limiting Their Exposure to
Stock Market Risk
Source: Robert L. Clark et al., “Making the Most of 401(k) Plans: Who’s Choosing What and Why,” in
Forecasting Retirement Needs and Retirement Wealth, ed. Olivia S. Mitchell, P. Brett Hammond, and Anna M.
Rappaport (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000).
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For this reason, most financial advisers
recommend that investors move from a pre-
dominantly stock-based portfolio when they
are young to fixed-income investments such
as bonds as they near retirement. Younger
workers have more time to make up for mar-
ket losses, and more future labor income
with which to supplement their savings. A
common rule of thumb is that the percent-
age of stocks in a worker’s portfolio should
equal “100 minus your age,” such that a 20-
year-old would begin his working life with 80
percent of his savings going into stocks and
retire at 65 with just 35 percent in equities.
Statistics from 401(k) plans show that
most workers stick reasonably close to these
guidelines.4 The average worker (Figure 2)
aged 60–65 years keeps about 40 percent of
his 401(k) assets invested in stocks and 60
percent invested in fixed-income assets such
as bonds. A younger worker, by contrast,
reverses the mix to 60-40 in favor of stocks.5
To illustrate the results of life-cycle invest-
ing, imagine a 65-year-old average-wage work-
er retiring today. One year ago he had
$100,000 in his personal account, of which he
had allocated 40 percent to the S&P 500 stock
index and 60 percent to the Lehman Brothers
aggregate bond index. What would his
account be worth today, assuming he made no
additional contributions in the last year?
Believe it or not, despite truly awful stock
market returns in the past year, a typical
worker’s account balance would be virtually
unchanged. The loss of 21.6 percent on the
stock portion of his portfolio would be
almost matched by the 9.9 percent gain on
the larger bond portion, for a total year-end
loss of just 3.25 percent (Figure 3). 
In other words, if that worker had started
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Figure 3
Typical Worker Aged 60-65 Would Have Lost Only about 3 Percent on His Account
Last Year
Source: Author's calculations. Nonstock portion of account assumed to be invested in Lehman Brothers long-
term bond index. Based on 21.6 percent loss on S&P 500 in prior year (net of dividends) and 9.9 percent gain on
Lehman Brothers bond index.
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the year with $100,000 in his account, he
would have ended with $97,288. This loss
would reduce his monthly retirement
income by only around $15.6
Moreover, a typical low-income worker
aged 60–65 has only 23 percent of his 401(k)
invested in equities. This low-income worker
would have made money last year, earning a
return of 2.6 percent as gains from the bonds
in his portfolio outweighed losses in the
stock market.
Any investor would rather make money
than lose it. But these results show that even
the poor stock market results of the past year
would have had only a small impact on a typ-
ical worker holding a personal retirement
account. As Dallas Salisbury of the Employee
Benefit Research Institute remarks, “There is
no retirement crisis because of the stock mar-
ket decline.”7 Workers’ retirement accounts
are sufficiently diversified that accounts lost
only 5–10 percent on average last year,
according to the Los Angeles Times, with those
nearing retirement presumably suffering
even smaller declines.8
Time Diversification: Stocks
for the Long Run
While relatively small portfolio declines
despite recent stock market losses may reas-
sure the nervous, what really matters for per-
sonal accounts isn’t how they would have
performed over the last year, or over any sin-
gle year. For retirement investment, what
matters is where you start and where you end
up. What happens in between is much less
important. Retirement investing is about the
long run, and over the long run stocks have
been remarkably safe investments.
As noted earlier, most workers diversify
their investments between stocks and bonds,
moving out of equities as they approach
retirement. Opponents of personal accounts,
however, often assume that workers have
their entire accounts invested in stocks, max-
imizing their risk in the event of a market
decline. Let’s see what that would mean.
Figure 4 uses a male worker earning the
average wage each year, currently $35,000,
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Figure 4
Even after Market Drop, Personal Account Would Pay Higher Return Than Traditonal
System
Source: Author's calculations.
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and retiring in 2002. It assumes that he
deposited 3 percentage points9 of his wages
in a personal account invested only in the
S&P 500 stock index. Compared to this
amount is the notional “wealth” he would
have accumulated by putting the same
amount of money into the current system.10
The return from Social Security is
assumed to be 1.74 percent annually above
inflation. This percentage is the return the
Social Security Administration projects that
a single male retiring today can expect from
his Social Security payroll taxes. This esti-
mate includes all retirement, survivors’, and
disability benefits. 11 Married couples, partic-
ularly those with only a single earner, could
expect somewhat higher returns. Future
retirees can generally expect lower returns
than those retiring today.
As Figure 4 shows, even with the recent
stock market decline, a worker investing only in
stocks would receive benefits 2.8 times higher
than he would had he “invested” the same
amount of money in the current program.
Put another way, the recent decline in
stock prices means the worker’s personal
account would be worth the same today as it
was worth in 1997. But that worker’s Social
Security “savings” would be worth today only
what the personal account was worth in the
late 1980s. It would take a much larger
decline than the one we have seen for a per-
sonal account to be a worse “deal” than the
current program.
Personal account–based reform propos-
als, such as those from the President’s
Commission to Strengthen Social Security,
establish an “offset interest rate” that gov-
erns the amount of traditional benefits an
individual must give up in exchange for
being allowed to invest part of his payroll
taxes in a personal account.12 If the personal
account’s rate of return equals the offset
interest rate, the amount deducted from the
worker’s traditional benefits would precisely
equal the amount he would gain via the
6
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Figure 5
Personal Accounts Would Increase Benefits for Workers Retiring Today, Even after
Giving Up Part of Their Traditional Benefits As Envisioned under Plans from the
President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security. 
Source: Author's calculations.
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account. If the account’s return exceeded the
offset interest rate, the worker would receive
higher total retirement benefits by virtue of
opting for an account.13
In the commission’s three reform proposals,
the members established offset interest rates at
3.5 percent, 2 percent, and 2.5 percent, respec-
tively. As Figure 5 shows, in all three cases a
worker retiring today and holding a personal
retirement account would have received an
average return exceeding the offset interest rate
and would therefore have received higher total
benefits by holding a personal account. 
Hence, even if the government must incur
costs to move the system to a sustainable
basis, which is the case regardless of whether
personal accounts are incorporated into the
program, at the margin a worker would have
been wise to opt for an account.
Some observers might note that for a
worker retiring today it was not until the
mid-1980s that the balance of the personal
account portfolios permanently exceeded the
notional balance accumulated via the per-
sonal account offset. This is not to say, how-
ever, that an individual who retired before
the mid-1980s would not have benefited by
holding a personal retirement account.
Figure 5 applies only to an individual retiring
this year. A worker retiring in the mid-1980s
would have begun investing in about 1940,
benefiting from years of above-average
growth during that period. 
Others would argue that reform proposals
make other changes to benefits in addition to
introducing personal accounts. Two of the
three reform models from the president’s com-
mission would reduce the rate of future benefit
growth in order to bring the system back to
financial balance. Some might object that
excluding these other changes gives an unreal-
istically optimistic picture of the benefits that
personal accounts might provide. 
But Social Security will require changes in
the future to balances its finances whether or
not personal accounts are introduced.14 If
these changes must take place even in the
absence of personal accounts, it is not inap-
propriate to examine the effects of accounts
as an individual element in overall reform.
Moreover, if Social Security were in financial
balance—as it is at present, even if not over
the long term—personal accounts could be
introduced without detriment to the tradi-
tional system’s long-term financing.15
Simulating Personal
Accounts through History
The Congressional Research Service took
a more wide-ranging look at market risk and
personal retirement accounts, using stock
and bond returns dating back to 1927 to sim-
ulate how individuals with personal accounts
would have fared had accounts been intro-
duced in the past.16
It is true, as the CRS finds, that stock
returns vary greatly from year to year. But
that variation takes place at a level higher
than that provided by Social Security. That is,
while historical returns don’t guarantee that
a worker retiring today would receive higher
benefits than a person retiring last year or
next year, he could be reasonably sure of
receiving more than if he had invested the
same amount of money in the traditional
pay-as-you-go program. Of the 35 different
41-year periods the CRS studied, there is not
one in which a worker who had invested his
payroll taxes in stocks would have been better
off remaining in the current system. On aver-
age, a personal account invested only in
stocks would produce benefits two and one-
half times higher than the traditional pay-as-
you-go program.
A mixed portfolio of stocks and bonds was
not always better than Social Security, but
nearly always so. Of the 35 different 41-year
periods studied, in 7 of them a worker would
have been better off investing his payroll taxes
in Social Security than in a 60-40 stock-bond
portfolio, though the difference is small, an
average of just 6 percent (Figure 6). 
The relative weakness of a mixed portfolio
during the 1970s is attributable to two factors.
First, investment returns were low by histori-
cal standards, with a slow economy reducing
7
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Table 1
Personal Account Benefit as Multiple of Average Benefit from Pay-As-You-Go Program
Portfolio
60 Percent Stocks/
Stocks Only 40 Percent Bonds
Average 2.60 1.39
Minimum 1.19 .80
25th percentile 2.15 1.13
50th percentile 2.51 1.41
75th percentile 2.96 1.64
Maximum 5.12 2.13
Source: Congressional Research Service, “Social Security Reform: The Effect of Economic Variability on
Individual Accounts and Their Annuities,” February 28, 2002.
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Figure 6
Stock Returns Vary but Consistently Exceed Those of the Traditional Pay-As-You-Go
Program
Source: Congressional Research Service, “Social Security Reform: The Effect of Economic Variability on
Individual Accounts and Their Annuities,” February 28, 2002.
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stock returns and high inflation making real
bond returns negative from 1970 to 1979.
Second, Social Security paid substantially
higher returns during that period than it does
today or will in the future. Workers retiring in
the 1970s received real annual returns from
Social Security averaging around 10 percent.
Future retirees can expect to receive returns of
approximately 2 percent, depending on their
income and marital status.17 While low mar-
ket returns are possible in the future, the cur-
rent Social Security program can never again
pay returns similar to those received during
the 1970s and before.
Overall, as Table 1 shows, a 60-40 stock-
bond portfolio would have paid an average of
39 percent more than Social Security, even
compared to the higher rates of return the cur-
rent program paid in the past. From the late
1970s onward, no individual—including indi-
viduals retiring today—would have been worse
off with a personal account than he would
have been had he remained in the current sys-
tem. All workers would have received higher
benefits by investing in personal accounts,
even if their accounts contained a high pro-
portion of bonds, and many workers would
have received much higher benefits.
These results may understate somewhat the
returns from personal account plans such as
those from the president’s commission,
because the CRS assumed administrative costs
of 1 percent of assets managed versus an esti-
mate of 0.3 percent of assets managed by Social
Security’s independent actuaries for the com-
mission’s account structure. Over a 41-year
working lifetime, a 0.7 percent increase in the
net investment return would increase the final
asset accumulation by slightly over 20 percent,
further increasing the advantage of personal
accounts over pay-as-you-go financing.
Long-Run Market Risk
Another way to consider stock market risk is
to compare the variations in returns over vari-
ous holding periods. Figure 7, adapted from
Stocks for the Long Run by Wharton School
finance professor Jeremy Siegel, shows the stan-
dard deviation of returns for stocks, bonds, and
Treasury bills held for different periods of time.
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Figure 7
Stocks Have Been Very Risky in the Short Term but More Stable over the Long Run
Source: Jeremy J. Siegel, Stocks for the Long Run (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1998), p. 32.
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The standard deviation measures the disper-
sion of statistical data, showing how much
individual instances tend to vary from the aver-
age for the group.18
In the short run, the standard deviation of
stock returns is very high, such that the
return in one year could be very different
from that of another. Fixed income invest-
ments, by contrast, have lower standard devi-
ations and hence lower risk.
Over the long term, however, the standard
deviation of stock returns has fallen. That is
to say, the return from holding stocks for,
say, 20 years does not vary so much, regard-
less of which 20-year period of American his-
tory you chose. For 30-year periods, the stan-
dard deviation of returns is lower still. 
Moreover, for long holding periods the
standard deviation of stock returns is actual-
ly lower than for bonds or Treasury bills.
That is to say, in a certain sense at least,
stocks were less risky over the long term than
bonds. It is this reduction of the variance of
returns over the long term that forms the
basis for the time diversification and for the
common advice for younger individuals to
hold riskier investments.
Worst-Case Scenarios
Opponents of personal accounts are
quick to point out that, while stocks have
high average returns, 
the promise of guaranteed protec-
tion against poverty cannot be “aver-
aged out” if some people feast on the
rewards of a rich stock account while
others cannot afford to eat. Social
Security is supposed to be there for
everyone, regardless of whether they
have good luck or know how to man-
age investments.19
Hence, opponents of reform are justified in
demanding that we look not just at the aver-
age returns available from personal accounts
but also at how people would fare if they expe-
rienced low returns over their lifetimes. 
Another way to look at stock investment for
personal accounts, then, is to look at the
extremes. If you had had a personal account and
received below-average returns on your invest-
ments, how badly would you have fared?20
As expected, stocks have often produced
large losses in the short term. For instance,
over single-year holding periods, the worst
performance from stocks in American histo-
ry was a loss of 38.6 percent, as shown in
Figure 8. The worst-case for bonds in a single
year was a loss of 21.9 percent and for
Treasury bills a loss of 15.6 percent.
Over the long term, however, annual gains
and losses offset each other. When stocks were
held for 10 years, the largest average annual
loss was 4.2 percent after inflation. Over 20
years or more, however, stocks have never
failed to produce positive returns, with the
worst annual return being 1 percent. Over 30
years, the worst annual return from stocks was
a gain of 2.6 percent after inflation. 
Bonds actually produced lower worst-case
returns over the long run than stocks. The
worst 30-year return from bonds was an
annual loss of 2 percent and for Treasury
bills, a loss of 1.8 percent. In other words, the
true worst-case scenarios would not have
involved stock investment but holding sup-
posedly “safe” government bonds.
Now, these figures assume that workers
hold a diversified portfolio replicating the
performance of the stock market as a
whole.21 A worker could lose his savings sim-
ply by investing his entire portfolio in one of
the approximately 200 public corporations
that declare bankruptcy in any given year.22 It
is precisely for this reason that all major per-
sonal account–based reform legislation man-
dates that workers not invest in single stocks
or even in single corporate sectors. Workers
with accounts could purchase only highly
diversified mutual funds holding dozens,
hundreds, or even thousands of stocks or
bonds. Some reform plans base their account
administration on the federal Thrift Savings
Plan, which gives workers the option to
invest in one or more of five stock or bond
10
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index funds, coupling simplicity and ex-
tremely low administrative costs with high
levels of diversification. Hence, while oppo-
nents of personal accounts cite the amount a
worker might have lost by investing in the
NASDAQ index, there is no existing reform
legislation that would allow such an invest-
ment to take place. 
In practice it would be next to impossible
for an individual to lose his money. To illus-
trate, imagine a worker who could invest in
either the S&P 500 stock index or in a fund of
AAA rated corporate bonds. Each year, he
moved his entire portfolio to the investment
that would reap the lowest returns for that
year. Even after making the worst investment
choices possible, he, if retiring today, would
still have had positive net returns on his port-
folio as a whole.23
Outstanding Issues
Despite the evidence of historical market
returns, policymakers and the public should
not treat equity investment for Social Security
or other purposes as if it constituted “free
money.” Actuarial analysis of reform legislation
can sometimes encourage this viewpoint:
although the text rightly highlights issues of
risk, the numbers that receive greater public
attention often appear to treat stocks as if they
were bonds with higher-than-average returns.
Whether equity investment is envisioned
through personal accounts or through a central
government-managed fund, the market
rewards people who are willing to take risk,
even if diversification and long time horizons
have historically ironed out the short-term fluc-
tuations of the stock market. 
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Worst-Case Scenarios: Unlike Supposedly "Safe" Bonds, Stocks Have Never Lost
Money over the Long Term
Source: Jeremy J. Siegel, Stocks for the Long Run (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1998), p. 27.
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Moreover, some observers believe that the
equity premium—that is, the extra reward
paid to holders of risky investments like
stocks over safer investments like short-term
bonds—could be smaller in the future than in
the past. Historically, stocks have paid a “risk
premium” of 6–7 percentage points over
safer investments like short-term govern-
ment bonds.24 Longer-term bonds such as
those held by the Social Security trust fund
also receive a premium of about 1 percentage
point over shorter-term bonds, primarily
because of the increased risk of inflation eat-
ing away the real returns.25
Some analysts believe that the relative
increase in stock returns in recent decades
(Table 2) reflects a reduction in the equity risk
premium demanded by investors. Such a
change in investor attitudes would increase
returns in the near term, because the price of an
asset will rise if investors perceive it to be less
risky. Once the price had adjusted, however, the
risk premium would be smaller than in the
past.26 While there is merit to this argument, it
remains the case that stocks are far riskier than
bonds in the short run and that the average
share on the New York Stock Exchange today is
held for less than one year.27 For shorter-term
investors, a substantial risk premium continues
to make sense.
A second current debate within the finance
community regards the question of time diversi-
fication, the degree to which long holding periods
reduce the risk of stock ownership. Zvi Bodie of
Boston College argues that, contrary to accepted
wisdom, the risk of owning stocks increases
rather than decreases with time.28 Bodie contends
that the proper measure of the risk of a stock
investment is the cost of a “put” option contract
allowing the holder to sell the stock in the future
at a price sufficient to guarantee a return no less
than that paid by short-term government
bonds.29 Bodie applies the Black-Scholes formula
used in pricing financial options, which give the
holder the right to buy or sell an asset at a desig-
nated price in the future. Since under the Black-
Scholes formula the cost of a put option increas-
es over time, Bodie concludes that the cost of
insuring against stock losses—and hence, the risk
of stocks—increases the longer you hold them.30
One difficulty with Bodie’s thesis is that the
Black-Scholes formula assumes that stock prices
follow a “random walk,” that is, that a gain or loss
in one period does not influence whether there
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Table 2
Since World War II, the Risk Premium Paid to Stocks Has Risen Sharply
Premium vs. Premium vs.
Long-Term Short-Term
Period Govt. Bonds Treasury Bills
1802–1997 3.5 4.1
1802–1870 2.2 1.9
1871–1925 2.9 3.4
1926–1997 5.2 6.6
1946–1997 6.4 7.0
Source: Jeremy J. Siegel, Stocks for the Long Run (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1998), pp. 13, 15.
will be gains or losses in the following period.
While that is true over the short time periods dur-
ing which options are ordinarily issued, over long
periods stock returns deviate substantially less
from the average than a random walk would pre-
dict (Figure 9). Adjusting Bodie’s model to
include the declining standard deviation of stock
returns over time confirms conventional wisdom
that time diversification can reduce the risk of
holding equities.31
While this debate continues, financial
advisers continue to recommend that equity
investment increase along with time hori-
zons, indicating continued belief that time
diversification will smooth the short-term
volatility of the stock market. 
Public Opinion on Personal
Accounts: Have Americans
Lost Faith?
Even workers retiring today, with the mar-
kets in turmoil, would have received high
total retirement incomes by virtue of holding
a personal retirement account. But does the
public still believe in personal accounts, or
has negative publicity associated with the
market decline caused Americans to lose
faith in Social Security reform?
By coincidence, the Cato Institute commis-
sioned a survey of public opinion on personal
accounts for the period July 8–12, 2002, dur-
ing which the Dow Jones Industrials Average
fell almost 700 points and executives at
WorldCom pleaded the Fifth Amendment in
congressional hearings that were investigating
corrupt corporate accounting methods. The
survey, undertaken by the respected polling
firm of Zogby International, would show the
effect of these factors on public support for
accounts.32
Despite all expectations, support for
accounts remained strong: fully 68 percent of
likely voters support the addition of voluntary
personal accounts to Social Security. For per-
spective, in July 1999, when the Dow was
almost 25 percent higher than today, only 54
percent of likely voters supported accounts.33
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of likely voters
support the addi-
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Figure 9
Over 45-Year Holding Periods, the Average Returns from Stocks Are More Constant
Than a "Random Walk" Would Predict 
Note: Historical returns based on arithmetic mean return for 45-year holding periods, 1802–2001. Simulated returns are
based on 1,000 instance random number generation with historical single-year mean return and standard deviation. 
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Despite the current market fluctuations,
55 percent of working-age voters today think
personal accounts are less risky than the cur-
rent system, which can remain solvent only
with substantial tax increases or benefit
reductions. By a two-to-one margin, likely
voters think the lesson of the Enron scandal
is that workers need more control over their
retirement savings, including personal
accounts for Social Security, not that mar-
kets are dangerous and that accounts
shouldn’t be allowed. By 62 to 22 percent,
likely voters believe that if Social Security
funds are to be invested privately, individuals
rather than government should undertake
and control that investment. 
Individual control is a recurring theme: vot-
ers cited it as the main reason for favoring per-
sonal accounts, even over higher benefits and
the ability to pass on the account to their heirs.
(Not surprisingly, risk was the most cited rea-
son for opposing personal accounts.) 
Although politicians may have grown ner-
vous as an election-year bear market gave their
opponents ammunition for attack, the public
appears to have remained strong and steady in
its support of Social Security reform incorpo-
rating personal retirement accounts.
Conclusion 
Short-term investors are right to be con-
cerned about short-term stock market
volatility. Long-term investors, such as those
saving for retirement, should focus more on
long-term returns and long-term volatility.
And over the time frames in which individu-
als would accumulate funds in their personal
accounts, diversified investments in stocks
and bonds remain a perfectly adequate
means to prepare for retirement. 
Indeed, a review of the evidence shows the
hysterical reactions of personal account
opponents to recent stock market declines to
be wholly overblown. Most workers nearing
retirement would have had relatively little
exposure to stock market risk and thus
would have experienced only small declines
in their account values. Most workers who
would have had large proportions of their
accounts invested in stocks would be young,
with many years to make up for today’s loss-
es. Even workers who had invested entirely in
stocks and who were retiring precisely when
the market had fallen would still have
received higher returns than the current
Social Security program can produce.
Historical evidence shows that even a worker
retiring in 1933, when the Great Depression
had dragged the stock market to its low,
would still have received a 4 percent average
annual return, twice what today’s average
worker can expect from Social Security.
Moreover, experience shows that workers
can invest their assets wisely, taking into
account stock market risk. In the 1980s and
1990s, millions of new investors entered the
market as employers shifted from traditional
defined-benefit pensions to employee-con-
trolled defined-contribution accounts. Many
of those new investors had little experience
with stocks or bonds, but data show that
generally they have made reasonable deci-
sions about how to allocate their assets as
they aged. Personal accounts would be
designed with new investors in mind, ensur-
ing low costs and adequate diversification so
that inexperienced investors did not lose
money because of high administrative fees or
inappropriate reliance on just a few stocks. 
Just as important, personal accounts give
workers the opportunity to stay out of the
stock market entirely if they so choose. They
could invest only in corporate or government
bonds and still receive higher benefits than
by staying in the current program. This fea-
ture stands in contrast to plans in which the
government itself would invest the Social
Security trust fund in the stock market. Not
only would such investment open the fund
to political manipulation, but it would also
make workers and retirees subject to stock
market risk, whether they desired it or not. 
Personal accounts are voluntary: no work-
er would be forced to choose one. Moreover,
no worker with a personal account would be
forced to invest even a penny in the stock
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market. Given the relative safety of long-run
diversified market investment, there is little
reason that individual workers should not be
allowed to choose. 
Yes, the stock market is risky, and individ-
uals should bear this risk in mind when mak-
ing investment decisions. But while oppo-
nents of personal accounts trumpet the
amount that accounts might have lost in the
past 4 years, they decline to discuss how
much workers would have gained over the
past 40—not just in dollars, but in the securi-
ty and dignity that come from ownership
and control of one’s own retirement wealth. 
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